Secure i-Voting Scheme with Blockchain Technology and Blind Signature

Mahmoud Al-Rawy and Atilla Elci

Cite: Al-Rawy M., Elci A. Secure i-Voting Scheme with Blockchain Technology and Blind Signature. J. Digit. Sci. 1(1), 3-14 (2019).

Abstract. In the last four years, blockchain technology affected largely all aspects of our lives. Blockchain started to launch a new technological revolution of storing digital transactions over the Internet, verifying the authenticity, licensing and providing the highest degree of security and encryption. Blockchain usage started with digital currency then its implementation extended to many industries such as voting, health records, copywriters, real estates and so on. However, it is time to upgrade the election scenario from practicing paper-based elections to use modern technologies in order to facilitate our lives. The fact that the blockchain technology has demonstrated almost infinite immutability and high resistance against hacking, lends credit to employ it in securing election data from fraud by saving every single piece of data, record or transaction with unchangeable history. In this paper, we propose and test implement a robust online voting system based on blockchain in order to prevent election forgery and ease the voting process for citizens. The essence of our research lies in abandoning alterable traditional databases and replacing them with two private blockchains that use the peer-to-peer network. Along with the blockchains, we utilized blind signature to maintain vote/voter privacy in order to safeguard voter eligibility validation against manipulation and forgery.  Lastly, we discuss a threat model, and suggest solutions overcome it; we also suggest a solution to identity impersonation and vote-selling problems.

Keywords: Blockchain, Internet Voting, Vote/Voter privacy, Blind Signatures, Public-Private Key algorithm anonymization.


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Published online 22.12.2019